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1. Introduction 
 
What new disaster dost thou here design? 
What horror for our realm and race invent? 
What unheard dangers or what deaths condign, 
Veiled by some name that soundeth excellent? 
What bribe of gorgeous reign, and golden mine, 
Whose ready offer is so rarely meant? 
What Fame has promised them? what pride of story? 
What palms? What triumphs? What victorious glory? 
(Camões/Burton 1572 [1880], 171) 
 
Thus spoke the “old man of Restelo”, an apocryphal character in The Lusiads, 
Portugal’s national epic by Luis Vaz de Camões, concluded around 1556. In this 
fulmination against Fame and Glory, he gave voice to those who, in the early years of 
Empire, doubted the success of Portugal’s overseas expansion and believed it would be 
detrimental to the development of the metropolis. His diatribe has not been forgotten 
since and resonates still throughout the historical literature.  
 
In this paper, we test the “old man’s” proposition with a study of the impact of 
Portugal’s colonial trade on its economy throughout the Early Modern period. Our 
aim is to come up with a fresh answer to the question posed by O’Brien and Prados de 
la Escosura (1998a, p.33), as well as many others: just how important were colonies for 
the development of the home economies?  
 
Towards this goal, we use an extensive new database for Portugal which includes 
three centuries of estimates of variables such as the real wage, urbanization rate, and 
intercontinental trade. Its development from scratch is necessary since previously 
available estimates are unsatisfactory in their methodology and insufficient in terms of 
the evidence on which they are based. Our first conclusion is that Portugal was a 
consistent leader among Early Modern colonial powers in terms of the value of per 
capita trade with its colonies. The second is that the impact of the empire on 
Portugal’s economy was small in the early fifteen hundreds, grew steadily over time 
and reached a substantial level around 1800. The third is that, nevertheless, this boost 
to growth was insufficient for Portugal to converge to the leading nations of the time - 
Britain and the Netherlands - themselves great colonizers.1 
 
It has been widely accepted, ever since the sixteenth century, that overseas empires 
were set up by Europeans principally with a view to material gain, a subject which has 
spawned a vast literature (Engerman 1998; Findlay and O’Rourke 2007). The part of 
this literature which focuses on the economic consequences for the mother countries 
has yielded a remarkable empirical harvest. Nevertheless, it has had limited success in 
establishing a consensus regarding the true nature of the relationship. Even in terms 
of the scale and direction of this effect, conclusions range widely, from negative to 
positive, and from small, or insignificant, to large and even critical to the economic 
performance of the colonizing nations.  
 
According to the Marx-inspired analyses of the 1960s and 1970s, the outcome for the 
world’s core economies was both large and beneficial. This enabled them to amass 
immense resources at the expense of their colonies and to channel them into long term 
growth and industrialization. For the lesser powers, however, the return was small 
                                                          
1 For an overview of Portuguese imperial history, see Bethencourt and Curto (2007). 
and possibly harmful (Wallerstein 1974; Braudel 1980). The cliometric response was 
to assemble an abundance of data and demonstrate that the value of transoceanic 
commerce was at best modest and that colonies were largely irrelevant as sources of 
raw materials, investment capital and demand for home manufactures (Thomas and 
McCloskey 1981; O’Brien 1982). 
 
Lately, the pendulum has swung back towards recognition that colonies may have 
made a significant and positive difference. The once “discredited” notion (Mokyr 1985, 
p.74) of a strong association between overseas and home economic expansion has had 
its reputation restored thanks to the rediscovery that “the intercontinental trade boom 
was a key development that propelled North-western Europe forwards” (Allen 2003, 
p.432). 
 
Yet from the standpoint of what were the ultimate causes, a good deal of disagreement 
remains. A political economy approach has emphasized the differential role of empire 
in the institutional development of the metropolis and the contrasting long run 
repercussions of this for the respective home economies (Davis 1973; Acemoglu et al. 
2005). A related line of work has stressed the value of colonies in terms of the influence 
they conferred upon imperial nations in the European theatre of military and political 
competition (Findlay and O’Rourke 2007). Cliometricians, on the other hand, have 
focused on the direct linkages between colonial and home economies when they 
estimate the counterfactuals which are the kernel of their analyses. A recent strand 
within this has paid particular attention to the role of the entrepôt trade and its 
ramifications in driving structural change in the home countries (Daudin 2006).  
 
The present case-study contributes in several ways to the “economics of empire” 
literature. First, while a great deal of research has concentrated on the Netherlands 
and Britain, typically seen as success stories, with Portugal we provide a much needed 
counterweight to this predominance of north-western European examples (O’Rourke, 
Prados de la Escosura and Daudin 2010). Secondly, we place ourselves firmly in the 
cliometric camp, but measure the impact of the empire on growth with a dynamic 
model, instead of with the habitual static, partial equilibrium method. Thirdly, our new 
and extensive macroeconomic database enables us to carry out this assessment for all 
the relevant countries and all the way back to 1500, over several benchmarks. This is 
better than concentrating only on a short period in the late 18th century, as usually 
occurs, since it allows us to grasp the long-run dynamics of empire better than if we 
relied on a single historical snapshot. 
 
2. Portuguese economic performance: past interpretations, new data 
 
The first requirement for a study such as this is to establish an accurate picture of 
Portugal’s economic growth between 1500 and 1800. Unfortunately, few modern 
studies have focused explicitly on the country’s long-term economic growth before the 
nineteenth century. Fewer still have used standard quantitative indicators, such as the 
real wage or GDP per capita, for this purpose. Notwithstanding, a consensus has 
emerged which considers that throughout the Early Modern period Portugal was 
chronically in the grip of economic stagnation and any gains in per capita economic 
growth were ephemeral and quickly dissipated. Godinho, the doyen of Portuguese 
economic historians, has stated that “the notion of decadence has shaped the great 
majority of historical studies on Portugal written during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries” (1968, II, p.232). 
 
Explanations for this lacklustre performance fall into three categories.2 One 
emphasizes the country’s relegation, after 1500, to a semi-peripheral role in the 
international division of labour of the Modern World-System (Wallerstein 1974, 
1980). This imposed an excessive reliance on foreign capital and commercial services 
(Mauro 1983, 1990), shipping (Rau 1954), and imports of manufactures (Sideri 1970), 
which inevitably stunted the most dynamic sectors. The second was the archaic and 
technically stagnant agricultural sector which struggled in vain to overcome the 
Malthusian trap and kept the mass of the population at the lowest levels of 
consumption (Justino 1981; Magalhães 2010; Oliveira 1980). The third was the empire. 
 
The colonial system has been for many the most important determinant of long-term 
economic backwardness. Successive overseas booms diverted resources and 
entrepreneurship from home manufacturing and held back the diversification of the 
economy (Godinho 1955; Macedo 1982). Agriculture languished due to the drain of its 
labour caused by the attraction of employment conditions in the empire or in the major 
port cities which serviced it (Sérgio, [1927] 1984). Meanwhile, the riches which 
flowed from the colonies made foreign foodstuffs more accessible, which crowded out 
domestic agriculture and prevented its improvement (Pedreira 1994). The inflow of 
colonial wealth had further deleterious effect. It promoted the emergence of a bloated, 
parasitic tertiary sector. This discouraged the rise of a development-minded national 
bourgeoisie which was capable of spearheading a change in structure based on 
manufacturing rather than on intermediation (Godinho 1978). 
 
Revisionist studies have lately suggested a less sombre portrayal. Serrão (2009) has 
argued that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the expansion and market 
integration of agriculture increased its specialization, internationalization, and 
technical progress.3 Pedreira (1994) and Madureira (1997) have similarly claimed 
significant extension and technical change in manufacturing, particularly from the 
1770s, under the impulse of rising colonial demand. Pedreira (1995) has also drawn 
attention to the rise, in the late 18th century, of a dynamic new merchant class 
characterized by unprecedented levels of wealth and technical sophistication.  
 
This approach has been reinforced by two recent efforts to quantify long run per capita 
GDP which have challenged traditional views on Portuguese economic stagnation. 
Maddison (2001) has estimated an increase of 52 per cent in this variable between 
1500 and 1820 and Valério (2010) has obtained an even higher figure – a rise of 72 per 
cent for the period 1500-1800. Both findings are problematic, however. One reason is 
the weakness of their empirical support. Maddison’s study uses an estimate of 
Castille’s long run GDP to represent the whole of Spain and, by extension, of 
Portugal. Valério’s employs one indicator alone – urbanization – to proxy GDP. This 
ignores the fact that long-run changes in economic structure or in sector productivity 
might have had a significant impact on the result of the exercise. 
 
The second problem regards the plausibility of such a dynamic portrayal when it is 
compared to other nations. In particular, the study of Holland (van Zanden and van 
Leeuwen 2012) shows that during roughly the same period (1510-14 to 1807-8), GDP 
per capita grew to a similar extent, that is, by 60 percent. How likely is it that this 
“first modern economy” (de Vries and van der Woude 1997), with one of the highest 
                                                          
2 For the most recent and up-to-date survey of Portuguese economic history, see Costa et al. (2011). 
3 Santos (2003) has argued the same for the large-scale, commercialized farming of southern Portugal 
and Oliveira (2002) has done so for the Beira Alta, a northern region of micro-farming.  
levels of capitalist development of the Early Modern period, would have had a similar 
growth performance to that of Portugal? 
 
To surmount these problems, we propose a new indicator of Portuguese 
macroeconomic performance. It is derived from an entirely new data set4 comprises 
prices, wages and rents, and is drawn from the usual archival sources.5  
 
Of the possible options for our purpose, ideally a GDP series would be best since if 
properly quantified, it captures the economic activity of all factors of production 
throughout the economy. In spite of this, for present purposes we use real wages as a 
proxy for real per capita income. There are three justifications for this. The most 
important is international coverage. For econometric reasons, the dataset we use to 
estimate our model (see section 4) must not be too small. In the case of real wages, 
data are available for the nine countries in Allen’s original sample plus Portugal. In 
that of real GDP, thorough and comparable estimates of GDP, however, have yet to be 
undertaken for four of them: Poland, Austria, France and Belgium.6 
 
The second reason is that while there is a wide consensus regarding the best way to 
calculate real wages in the Early Modern period, the same cannot be said for GDP. 
Estimating the latter calls for a larger and more important number of assumptions and 
consequently multiplies the degree of discretion involved in the process.7 Finally, as 
Williamson has pointed out, the deflators for these two yardsticks can diverge 
appreciably and this “may matter a great deal” (1995, p.143), an argument echoed by 
Allen, when he concludes that, all things told, in this epoch “income […] is best 
measured by the real wage” (2003, p. 406). 
 
We construct real wage series for skilled and unskilled labour following a widely 
adopted methodology (Allen 2001; Malanima 2011). Nominal wages, which are mainly 
from the building sector, are drawn from Portugal’s leading city – Lisbon – and 
deflated by a CPI constructed on the basis of a constant basket of consumables, which 
includes both foodstuffs and manufactures. The standard of reference consists of the 
price and consumption pattern of Strasbourg in the decade 1745-1755. This allows us 
to compare Portuguese real wages with those of other countries across Europe. 
 
Figure 1 displays real wage indicators for Portugal from 1500 to 1800. The most 
salient feature is the pronounced decline in the standard of living in Portugal during 
the Early Modern period. Skilled labour performed slightly better than unskilled but 
severe deterioration - of the order of 50 percent - was experienced in both cases. This 
came about in three stages. The first occurred during the initial one hundred and fifty 
years. It was followed by a recovery from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth 
centuries. Finally, in the last half century under consideration a sharp decline took 
place again. A second point is that these data amply corroborate the traditional view of 
an era of “decadence” in Portugal’s macroeconomic fortunes. The third is that although 
the (implicit) skill premium is not constant over time, it has no trend. This suggests 
                                                          
4 These data have been compiled in the context of the project “Prices, Wages and Rents in Portugal, 
1300-1910” funded by the Portuguese Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia. The original figures can 
be consulted at http://pwr.dev.simplicidade.com.pt/000000/1/index.htm. 
5 To ensure homogeneity, data are expressed in grams of silver and standardized in the metric system.  
6 The remaining countries in this set are England, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Germany. 
7 Examples of this discretion are the choice of food demand elasticities; alternative ways of obtaining per 
capita income to use in the agricultural demand function; and different ways of interpolating a proxy for 
non-agricultural output. 
that using one or the other wage series to represent per capita income makes little 
difference. We adopt the skilled labour wage for the sake of consistency with the 
international data set which we make use of here. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Figure 2 shows how the Portuguese economy fared in comparison with the 
international context. The country emerges as a member of the group of Early 
Modern “less successful” economies – along with Italy, Spain, Austria, Germany and 
France – which underwent substantial real wage deterioration, of around 50 per cent 
over the course of these three centuries. The “leading” ones – England and the 
Netherlands – failed to grow overall but withstood Malthusian pressures and 
consistently experienced relatively high wage levels (Allen et al. 2012). In a European 
mirror, Portugal’s Early Modern economy was thus hardly a case of unusual 
backwardness. What makes it stand out is that it combined a low level of income with 
a significant colonial system and this raises the issue of whether the latter was a help 
or a hindrance to its long-term economic performance. 
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
3.  The contribution of empires to economic growth: how should we measure it? 
 
In this section we consider two methodological choices. The first regards the best way 
to measure the material benefits accruing to European powers from their possession of 
empires. The second concerns which is the most appropriate model for estimating the 
quantitative nature of the relationship between these gains and national income. 
 
3.1. The choice of metric 
 
Colonies were beneficial to the home country in many ways. They allowed the 
mobilization of unused natural resources situated overseas, thereby creating some 
slack in Europe’s Malthusian constraint. They helped to reallocate underutilised 
domestic resources to the same destination and thus enhanced their productivity. They 
created new markets to serve as outlets for domestic production and as a result 
promoted scale economies and the division of labour. Thanks to the use of political and 
military might, imperial powers were also able to earn rents by distorting price 
mechanisms in the markets strung out along the chains of supply which connected 
them to their ultramarine possessions. 
 
To encompass this diversity within a simple metric is no easy matter. One solution is 
to calculate separately the gains and losses from the many relevant types of activity, 
and then weight and aggregate those using appropriate prices. The alternative is to 
employ as a proxy a value index of each country’s total transoceanic trade and deflate 
it with a suitable set of commodity prices. 
 
In order to cohere with the specifications of Allen’s model (2003), we opt for the latter. 
This leads us to define our yardstick as total exports of products of the mother country 
to the colonies plus the commodities sent by the colonies to the mother country. 
Consequently, it excludes two major items of trade: exports to the colonies of goods 
produced in countries other than the metropolis, and re-exports of colonial 
commodities whether processed or not in the home economy. The assumption 
underlying this choice is that inter-oceanic trade was the principal conduit through 
which the material benefits of empire were funnelled to the home country. Although 
this supposition does not appear far-fetched, it is important nevertheless to assess what 
it entails. 
 
Our preferred approach has several advantages. It is simple, easy to construct and 
requires relatively small data inputs. On the negative side, two aspects have to be 
weighed. One is the exclusion of re-exports, which entails disregarding the profits of 
both the entrepôt trade and of processing of these commodities before re-export. Since 
both were high, the distortion might be significant.8 Including re-exports, however, 
would also be distortive in the opposite direction, as it would mean double-counting on 
a similarly sizeable scale. It seems likely that the difference between the two scenarios 
will not be large, although this cannot be said with certainty. 
 
The second drawback of a “simplified” trade-based proxy for the gains from empire is 
that it ignores non-trade items such as remittances, investment and income from 
capital. Whilst these are pertinent, direct evidence regarding them is not easy to come 
by.  Given the nature of mercantilist relations and the consequent close integration of 
home and colonial markets, it seems probable that colonial development varied 
commensurately with the flows of capital and colonisers arriving from the mother 
country, as well as with their earnings. This makes it likely that these invisible flows 
would have been highly correlated with trans-oceanic trade and therefore reasonably 
proxied by it.9 
 
In view of the decision to treat transoceanic trade flows as a key variable in our 
research strategy, it is important at this point to examine comparatively its main 
features. Figure 3 assembles the available data for Portugal and the four other 
principal colonial nations – England, France the Netherlands and Spain – and displays 
their respective values at 1700 prices for five different benchmarks. Observations are 
standardized by the respective metropolitan populations, to render them comparable. 
In the cases of Portugal and Spain, we show two versions of this indicator, one 
including precious metals (#1) and the other without them (#2). Recognition is thus 
given to the importance of these items in their overseas trades. At the same time, this 
allows for the point of view of those for whom American gold and silver should be 
treated as “loot” (Allen 2003; O’Brien 2005) and therefore left out of these calculations. 
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from these data. The first is that over the Early 
Modern period, trans-oceanic trade volumes varied considerably across time and from 
empire to empire. The second is that inter-colonizer variations do not fit well into any 
logic either of metropolitan population size or of degree of economic development. The 
third is that before 1800 the per capita trade of Portugal with its colonies was 
consistently one of the most significant among the “Atlantic traders”. It trended 
upward from the dawn of empire to the mid-18th century by a factor of 300 per cent 
(or 200 per cent without gold), and declined slightly (24 per cent) in the last fifty years 
                                                          
8 For the late eighteenth century, Pedreira (1994, 273) estimates that the mark-up on the prices of 
colonial imports for the three most important Brazilian re-exports – sugar, hides and cotton – was 
around 50 percent. In terms of the share of imports from Brazil which were re-exported, the order of 
magnitude was, for sugar, at least 80 per cent and, for tobacco, circa 70 per cent (Mauro 1983; Macedo 
1982). 
9 Empirical corroboration for this hypothesis for the Early Modern period is hard to come by but some 
is provided by Cuenca Esteban (2004, 48-9). 
of the period. In the sixteenth century, when Spain was its only rival, it far 
outdistanced it. At the turn of the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries, it was 
overtaken by the Netherlands but stayed ahead of England, Spain and France. It led all 
the colonial nations again in the mid-1750s and fell behind England and the 
Netherlands in the second half of this century. 
 
3.2. The choice of model 
 
Estimating the impact of colonies on imperial economies is normally carried out by 
means of counterfactuals. There are two ways of doing this. One is a static, partial 
equilibrium approach. The other is a dynamic, general equilibrium one.  
 
The use of the first dates back to the early stages of the cliometric revolution. It 
compares the income of the mother country at a given historical moment with that of a 
hypothetical situation in which the empire did not exist. Once this has been 
standardized by a macroeconomic yardstick, the differential between them measures 
the empire’s contribution to the welfare of the metropolis. Two procedures have been 
used to implement this strategy. One compares the social rate of return from the actual 
investment made by the home country in the colony with the yield obtainable 
elsewhere with the same stock of capital plus or minus an appropriate risk premium 
(Thomas 1968). The other follows the lines of a “natural experiment”. It contrasts the 
economic achievement of two historical situations: a moment when the empire 
functioned normally, and another, shortly afterwards, when it no longer existed 
(Pedreira 1994; Prados de la Escosura 1993). 
 
The literature based on the static approach has concluded that empires contributed 
only modestly to the economic development of their respective mother countries. 
Indeed, O’Brien and Prados have warned that “arguments that reify European 
expansion overseas into the engine of economic progress should be strongly qualified” 
(1998b, p. 5). In the case of Spain, between 1784/1796 and 1815/1820 the end of the 
empire entailed a loss of between 3.0 and 8.4 per cent of GDP (Prados de la Escosura 
1988, 1993). In the case of Portugal, the loss of GDP in the interval 1796/1806 to 
1827 was in a range from 3.4 to 8.0 per cent (Pedreira, 1994).10 Results of a similar 
order of magnitude have been found for Britain (Thomas and McCloskey, 1981). 
 
 
The alternative procedure which we espouse here is suggested by Allen’s recent work 
on the factors of economic success or failure in Early Modern Europe (Allen 2003, 
2009).  This is a reduced form estimation of an underlying dynamic multi-country 
general equilibrium model11. Four equations are solved recursively over a succession of 
periods, in order to explain the dynamics of four endogenous variables which 
characterize the structure and performance of early modern economies. The variables 
interact with each other but also have as “prime movers” a number of exogenous 
variables, including transoceanic trade. This provides the opportunity for quantifying 
                                                          
10 These large intervals are the result of the dispersion of GDP estimates available at the time when 
these studies were undertaken. According to Lains (1991), in the case of Portugal the reduction due to 
the emancipation of Brazil would have been between only 1.0 and 2.4 per cent, owing to his adoption of 
a considerably larger estimate for GDP. 
11 It is well known in the macro and finance literature that reduced form models often have better 
predicting capacity than attempts at structural modelling. 
the link between the home economy and that of its overseas possessions at each 
benchmark and on a country by country basis. 
 
A comparative evaluation of the two approaches suggests the superiority of the latter 
(O’Rourke, Prados and Daudin 2010, pp. 109-10). The most important aspect is that it 
is explicitly dynamic and takes into account a variety of causal factors, in contrast to 
its rival which is static, based on partial equilibrium and disregards explicit causal 
identification mechanisms. Consequently, the former takes external and inter-temporal 
effects into consideration, and this causes it to generate results which are not only 
different but systematically larger than those obtained from the older methodology. 
 
Comparative static cost-benefit accounting does not consider how unutilized resources 
would be employed in a situation of no-empire. It is hence unable to quantify a part of 
the impact of trade on growth which is likely to be substantial (Findlay and O’Rourke 
2007, p. 337). The counterfactual of “what would happen to a given economy without 
trade” ought not to correspond simply to wiping out trade and assuming all else 
equations stay unchanged, especially over longer periods of time. 
 
Finally, the static cost-benefit analysis is at a practical disadvantage because it requires 
a greater amount of empirical knowledge concerning the relations between the 
components of the imperial system, as well as between the sectors of the colonial and 
domestic economies. As a consequence, followers of this approach seldom present 
findings for more than one point in time, given the highly onerous nature of the task. 
They often find that “the evaluation of the benefits of Empire is difficult both to 
describe and measure” (Engerman 1998, p. 216). 
 
This is not to say that our own model has no limitations. The most obvious danger is 
that some of the identification assumptions may not be valid and if so the model’s 
external validity can be open to question12. In this paper, we go beyond Allen’s method 
and estimate the model using panel data methods. This should help attenuate omitted 
variable problems as long as the sources of idiosyncrasy are approximately constant in 
time. In the appendix ( A.3) we show there is no substantive change in the results.  
 
4. Estimation and simulation 
 
As Allen (2003) notes, Portugal is a notable absence from his study. In this section we 
re-estimate several versions of his model of the early modern economy, now including 
newly minted data for Portugal. Using the coefficients thus obtained, we calculate two 
scenarios – the no-intercontinental trade counterfactual and the model’s simulation of 
the historical situation. 
 
The model considers a sequence of periods in which the real wage, agricultural 
productivity, urbanization and the share of labor in proto-industry are endogenous 
variables. These are complemented by a number of variables which are held to be 
exogenous, such as the land-labor ratio, manufacturing productivity, the extent of 
enclosure, real energy prices, the volume of colonial trade, lagged urbanization, and a 
‘prince’ dummy for institutions. Lagged urbanization serves as the model’s state 
                                                          
12 Pleijt and van Zanden (2013) show that alternative econometric specifications can lead to some 
conclusions which are divergent to those of Allen, yet the link between intercontinental trade and 
urbanization is robust to their proposed changes. 
variable. It tells us all we need to know about the past in the beginning of a new 
period. These variables are listed in table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The model is linear and further identified by a series of exclusion restrictions which 
apply to the endogenous variables. The wage is assumed not to affect proto-industry 
or urbanization directly (notice it can still do so indirectly through its effect on 
agricultural productivity). Proto-industry is assumed to influence only agricultural 
productivity directly. Urbanization is allowed to have an effect on both the wage and 
agricultural productivity directly, but not proto-industry. Finally, agricultural 
productivity can directly affect all three other endogenous variables.  It is important to 
notice that all such restrictions are contemporaneous identification assumptions. With 
a one period lag, every variable can affect every other through its effect on past 
urbanization. 
 
Estimation 
 
In columns (1) and (2) of tables 2 and 3 we present OLS estimates for the model. These 
have no causal interpretation, but show partial correlations which are of interest for 
comparative purposes. In columns (3) and (4) we replicate Allen’s 2SLS estimates.13 
 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
One way to improve the estimation is to take advantage of the panel data structure of 
the data. One possibility would be to use the fixed effects estimator, which allows 
controlling for time-invariant unobserved country-specific idiosyncrasies, something 
which could be leading the previous pooled methods to inconsistent parameter 
estimates14. However, using the fixed effects estimator does mean that we cannot use 
lagged urbanization as a dependent variable in a fixed effects estimation of the 
urbanization equation (Nickell 1981). 
 
In keeping with the spirit of Allen’s model, we want to include lagged urbanization as 
a covariate in the equation for urbanization, which means that we enter the context of 
a dynamic panel-data model. Consequently, we use the well-known Arellano-Bond 
estimator, which is a consistent GMM estimator for ‘short’ panels, and makes 
allowance for the fact that the unobserved panel-level effects are by construction 
correlated with the lagged dependent variables. This estimator allows for idiosyncratic 
heteroskedastic errors which are correlated within countries, but not across countries. 
Columns (5) and (6) of the same tables display the results of the Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimation. 
                                                          
13 Subsequent data revision to Allen’s original dataset means the estimates do not exactly match those in 
Allen (2003, 2009), but they are always very close. 
14 As is usually the case, the Hausman test strongly rejects the random effects model in favor of the 
fixed effects model. 
Inspection of the results shows that the various estimated coefficients and standard 
errors do not change much, either when Portugal is included in the original sample or 
when alternative methods are used15. 
 
To simulate real wage levels for Portugal, we employ these coefficients and the 
historical data for the different explanatory variables. The next step is to repeat the 
exercise, with the same historical values, except that this time the volume of colonial 
trade is zero. The difference between the two outcomes measures counterfactually the 
impact on the home country’s economy of having colonies, as opposed to not having 
them. This is carried out for every benchmark in the three centuries considered16.  
 
5. Results and implications 
 
In this section, we go over the results of the simulations described above.  We start by 
looking at their implications in terms of specific issues pertaining to Portuguese long 
term economic performance.  We then broaden the perspective, placing them alongside 
the experience of other Early Modern colonizers, to obtain fresh comparative insights. 
 
Figure 4 enables us to construct a time line for the direct impact on the Portuguese 
economy of the country’s imperial endeavour. The upper line (intercontinental trade 
inclusive of gold) refers to the simulated real wage generated by the model when all 
its variables assume their respective historical values and transoceanic trade comprises 
precious metals as well as commodity exports and imports. The next line down 
(simulation) reflects the counterfactual values of the real wage in the benchmark 
scenario when precious metals have been removed but all else stays as historically 
observed. The lowest line (no intercontinental trade) represents the real wage in the 
event of a complete shut-down of colonial trade. The colonial impact on the home 
economy is given, in two versions, by the difference between the two first lines and the 
last one standardized by the real wage. 
 
FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
Four major findings emerge, all of which challenge widely-held views regarding the 
contribution to Portugal’s economic growth of its empire before 1800. The first is that 
the colonies were consistently beneficial to the home economy: the real wage 
differential associated with having an empire was positive throughout the period. The 
second is that, instead of running out of steam, over time the trend of this impact never 
ceased to escalate. 
 
At the dawn of the sixteenth century, when the empire concentrated on the Indian 
Ocean and the China Sea, the disparity between national income with and without 
colonies respectively was less than one per cent, an indication that the legendary riches 
of Orient were much exaggerated by contemporaries (Pedreira 1998). The gradual 
retreat from Asia, following the initial expansion and the ensuing repositioning to 
                                                          
15 See appendix A2 for additional discussion, including formal tests and robustness procedures. In 
particular we test for, and reject, the possibility of a weak IV problem. Notice the often-used ‘F-statistic 
greater than 10’ rule of thumb from Staiger and Stock (1997) only applies to one endogenous variable 
being instrumented and, in any case, is now outdated. See the on-line appendix for a number of 
robustness tests, including the weak IV tests reviewed by Stock and Yogo (2005). 
16 This exercise can be performed additionally for the other endogenous variables – agricultural total 
factor productivity, urbanization and proto-industrialization. In the appendix we show the simulation 
results for these variables. 
Brazil, changed Portugal’s colonial vocation, from trade and navigation to tropical 
slave plantations and mineral extraction. It also increased relative gains from overseas 
activity significantly. By 1600, these had risen four-fold relative to the 1500 level and 
seven-fold by 1700. By 1800, the “historical” real wage was thirty per cent higher than 
if the empire had not existed.17 
 
The third conclusion is that in spite of this positive contribution, the empire did not 
prevent the country’s sustained long run economic decline. During the first two 
centuries the gains from overseas were insufficient to overcome the secular contraction 
of domestic per capita income. During the seventeen hundreds, notwithstanding a 
substantially increased boost, they were just enough to neutralize the negative impact 
of Malthusian pressures on the home economy. 
 
The fourth outcome is methodological in nature. It confirms the initial expectation 
that a static model would lead to systematic underestimation. For 1800, the only 
benchmark which at present allows a precise comparison, the dynamic approach 
reveals gains from Empire which are three times those reached by Pedreira (1994) for 
the same period with a static approach. This suggests that earlier cliometric efforts 
probably missed significant effects.  
 
While they reveal the empire’s considerable contribution to Portugal’s economic 
performance, these results leave two critical issues unresolved. One of them is whether 
Portugal’s imperial effort would still look as impressive when compared with that of 
other colonial powers and using the same procedures as employed above for Portugal? 
The other is, in the event of Portugal passing this test, why were its colonies unable to 
promote the country’s convergence to the leading economies of this epoch? 
 
To answer them we need to consider these problems in the framework of a 
comparative economic history of empires. The current and well-established consensus 
provided by the latter claims that before 1800 the impact of colonial systems on their 
metropolitan economies varied widely. Britain and the Netherlands are supposed to 
have gained “disproportionately” from overseas expansion; Spain and Portugal “ended 
up as losers”; and France was somewhere in between (O’Brien 2005; Landes 1998). 
Several reasons have been cited for this distribution, namely the “late comer” status of 
the Anglo-Dutch “free riders” in the 18th century (O’Brien 2005); their superiority in 
terms of institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2005) or of corporate governance (Rei 2011); and 
the heavy investment costs endured by the Iberian “early starters”, possibly beyond 
their means (O’Rourke et al. 2010).  
 
We now turn to the verification of these assertions as a way to answer the first of our 
two questions. For this we repeat our earlier calculation of the relative economic 
impact of empire on the Portuguese economy, but applying it this time to all the other 
relevant countries as well. Table 4 displays the complete set of these estimates for the 
period 1500-1800. To our knowledge, it constitutes the first accurate, empirically well-
founded and consistent description of how, over these three centuries, the five main 
imperial metropoles transformed the inputs accruing from their overseas possessions 
into national income increments.  
 
 
                                                          
17 If gold is left out of the picture, the difference is around 22 per cent. This result helps to clarify the 
importance of Brazil’s mining sector for Portugal’s eighteenth century economy. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
The picture we obtain confirms the high degree of dispersion among nations recorded 
by the standard view. The latter, however, is almost entirely contradicted by this new 
evidence when it comes to ranking countries in terms of this indicator of colonial 
economic impact. Britain is somewhat of an exception in that it still appears as the 
most effective colonial power in the late eighteenth century, though not at all for the 
earlier benchmarks. The same is true for the Netherlands but, in this case, its 
performance is comparatively modest throughout the entire period. Despite its grand 
image of an expansionist past, France’s unusually weak imperial achievement also 
denies the conventional wisdom, whichever century is considered. Spain is the only 
instance in which reality matches the popular belief, in this instance, of an empire 
without significant benefits. 
 
What is unexpected is Portugal’s persistent leadership in terms of this yardstick, ahead 
of all the “Atlantic traders” and even during the seventeen hundreds, an era when 
much greater and richer powers vied to impose their might overseas. What is still 
more remarkable, however, is the puzzle this poses. Why, in spite of this vigorous 
imperial success, Portugal’s real per capita income gap with Britain, as shown in figure 
2, proved impossible to narrow, and indeed even widened during the all-important 
eighteenth century?  
 
The explanation is in fact simple and relies on an additional yardstick for colonial 
performance, namely the “empire extraction rate”. This, as its name suggests, 
expresses the difference between the historical and the counterfactual real wage in 
absolute terms at a given point in time. It is expressed in “real wage units” and is 
therefore directly comparable to the real wage gap between any two economies. It is 
displayed in table 5, in the higher level of each cell, for all five countries and all 
benchmarks under consideration.  
 
During the entire Early Modern period, Portugal’s “extraction rate” nearly always led 
those of its colonial rivals. Portugal’s real wage, being simultaneously among the 
lowest, the colonial economic impact described in table 4 - a relative measure – 
naturally comes out as one of the highest. Convergence with Britain driven by colonial 
expansion, however, would only occur if two conditions were satisfied. One was that 
Portugal’s colonial extraction would have to be greater than that of the leading 
economy. This was normally the case, except for 1800. The other is that the difference 
between the respective extraction rates should come close to annulling the real wage 
discrepancy between the two countries. This was far from happening at any moment in 
the period considered. In order to allow us to grasp how these requirements were met, 
Table 5 also exhibits, in parenthesis, the ratio of the “empire extraction rate” 
differential between Portugal and Britain to their respective real wage gap.18 
                                                          
18 This is calculated, for each country i ≠ Britain and each period t, as 
 
For instance, the value for comparing Britain with France in 1700 is 18.5%. This is the percentage of 
the differential in real wages explainable by the differential effect of empires. For Portugal, the number 
is often negative because the empire is contributing towards convergence to Britain. The exceptions are 
1600, when Portugal has a higher real wage than Britain, so Portugal’s empire is contributing towards 
maintaining the divergence; and either 1750 or 1800, when Britain’s empire extraction ratio for the first 
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
The eighteenth century is the time when, for Portugal, the catch-up hypothesis based 
on colonial expansion is the most plausible. The values we obtain in table 5 show 
unequivocally that a significant approximation to the British income standard then 
would have necessitated a Portuguese colonial expansion of an order of two or three 
hundred per cent given that growth would have to be mainly extensive. In a 
plantation-based economy, where barriers to technological improvement were 
probably insurmountable and production was labour-intensive to a high degree, such a 
scenario is unavoidable. However, it would also be historically unimaginable since it 
would have required an immense growth in the number of colonial inhabitants, both in 
slaves and in Portuguese settlers. Assuming proportionality, this would have implied a 
drain of at least a third of the mainland population, an altogether improbable scale of 
events19. The conclusion is that convergence, if it were to happen, could only have 
come from developments internal to the home economy, since those from overseas 
would never suffice. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This paper takes Portugal as a case study for assessing the benefits of seaborne 
empires for the economic development of early modern nations. The starting point and 
the puzzle come from the revision of the economic statistics for this country, which 
portray it as one of Europe’s least successful macroeconomic performers of this period 
but also as one of the world’s most vigorous colonial traders in per capita terms. 
 
We conclude that in the long run Portugal’s empire demonstrated a considerable 
degree of dynamism and contributed positively to the economic fortunes of the mother 
country. This goes against the common belief in a “long-term stagnation of the 
[Iberian] colonial economies” (Coatsworth 2005, 237). Our paper also diverges from 
the approach of the proponents of “modern world-systems” (Wallerstein 1980) in that 
we show semi-peripheral Portugal was able to gain as much or more from its empire in 
relative terms as the leaders of the Early Modern core. At the same time, Portugal’s 
imperial strength did not translate into economic convergence to its colonial arch-
rivals, which were also the richer economies of the day: England and the Netherlands.  
 
There is an important sense in which it should not be surprising that Portugal’s 
empire did not to lead to larger welfare effects. This is that in a Malthusian world, all 
returns from empires should be irrelevant over the long run. Any “windfall” gains (or 
losses) from the empire should be followed by the combined effect of preventive and 
positive checks on the labour market until the real wage is back to the ‘subsistence’ 
steady state level.  
 
What is remarkable is that gains from the intercontinental trade associated with 
empire, in the case of England and the Netherlands, led to long-run effects on 
                                                                                                                                                                          
time surpasses that of Portugal (the exact benchmark depends on whether gold is accounted for; see 
table 5). 
19 In 1800, a high point of colonial expansion, Brazil’s white population was about a million, while that 
of slaves was 1.6 million (Livi-Bacci 2002). To double output, we assume that both components would 
also have to double. The extra million Portuguese settlers required would thus represent a loss of one 
third of the home country’s inhabitants and more, as a proportion of total adults.  
urbanization, the real wage, and structural change (Allen 2003, 2009; de Vries and van 
der Woude 1997). For these nations, the empire apparently did help in achieving an 
early escape from Malthus. Hence one way to interpret our results is to emphasise that 
there was something ‘special’ about England and the Netherlands – but whatever the 
ultimate cause of it was, it could not have been just a high amount of trade per capita, 
since Portugal had just as high an amount, or even higher. 
 
Indeed, despite considerable benefits from empire, Portugal’s economy diverged. This 
was because while the positive effect of intercontinental trade was undoubtedly 
significant, it was only one among several proximate factors contributing to growth. 
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the differential in real wages between 
England and Portugal was small, the contribution of empire to Portugal’s real wage 
was diminutive too. By 1700, the wage differential between them had become much 
larger and thereafter never ceased to increase, to an extent that no realistic amount of 
additional colonial expansion could possibly erase.  
 
In Portugal, some combination of institutional and Malthusian forces did not allow the 
empire to become a great escape towards modern economic growth. Portugal’s empire 
was successful in a comparative perspective, but still the ultimate causes behind the 
economic growth in England and the Netherlands did not materialize there. The fact is 
that the problem lay elsewhere – on the home front. 
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Figures and tables 
 
 
Fig 1.Real wages in Portugal, 1500-1800. Sources: see text. 
 
 
 
Fig 2. Real Skilled Wages in Europe, 1500-1800. Sources: for Portugal, see text; for the other countries, 
see Allen (2003) 
 
 
Fig 3. Intercontinental trade per capita, 1500-1800. 1800 trade values for France 
correspond to 1788 and those of the Netherlands to 1780. Sources: for Portugal, see the 
appendix A1; for France 1788, data kindly supplied by Guillaume Daudin, and converted 
at the exchange rate of one livres tournois equals 1/25th of a pound sterling; for the 
Netherlands 1780, van Zanden and van Leeuwen (2012), converted at the exchange rate of 
10.5 guilders equals one pound sterling. For all other data, see Allen (2003).  
 
Variable Abbreviation Type Construction method Sources 
Natural log of the real wage LNWAGE Endogenous As in Allen (2001) PWR 
Natural log of the urbanization ratio LNURB Endogenous Towns over 5,000 inhabitants Bairoch (1988) 
Natural log of agricultural TFP LNAGTFP Endogenous As in Allen (2003) PWR 
Natural log of the proto-industrial 
labour share 
LNPROTO Endogenous - See  appendix A1 
Natural log of the land-labour ratio LNTL Exogenous As in Allen (2003) See appendix A1 
Institutions dummy PRINCE Exogenous By analogy with Spain De Long and Sheifler (1993) 
Enclosure ENCL IV By analogy with Spain Allen (2003) 
Natural log of the lagged 
urbanization ratio 
LNURBLAG IV - - 
Intercontinental trade per capita TRADEPOP IV See appendix A1 See  appendix A1 
Spanish empire dummy SPANEMP IV - - 
British empire dummy BRIT 18 IV - - 
Energy price ENERGY IV - Allen (2009); PWR 
Manufacturing TFP MANPROD IV Dual method PWR 
Literacy LIT IV By analogy with Spain Allen (2003) 
Table 1. List of variables  
 Table 2. The wage equation. Standard errors in (1)-(4) are robust and small sample adjusted. Trade volume for 
Portugal is exclusive of gold. In specifications (3)-(6) the endogenous variables LNAGTFP and LNURB are 
instrumented by Allen’s eight instruments and two exogenous variables (Allen 2009). Sources: see text. 
 
Table 3. The urbanization equation. Standard errors in (1)-(4) are robust and small sample adjusted. 
Trade volume for Portugal is exclusive of gold. In specifications (3)-(6) the endogenous variable 
LNAGTFP is instrumented by Allen’s eight instruments and two exogenous variables (Allen 2009). 
Sources:  see text. 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
LNWAGE 
(1) 
Allen (2009) 
Excluding 
Portugal 
(2) 
Allen 
(2009) 
Including 
Portugal 
(3) 
Allen (2009) 
(4)                
Allen (2003) 
including 
Portugal 
(5)                 
Allen (2009) 
(6)                
Allen (2009) 
including 
Portugal 
Estimator OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel 
GMM 
Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel 
GMM 
       
LNTL 
.5005796*** 
(.0749625) 
.4774391*** 
(.0657473) 
.5037174*** 
(.0925935) 
.4440452*** 
(.0993357) 
.5037174*** 
(.0993711) 
.4440452*** 
(.0977022) 
LNURB 
.186653** 
(.0779664) 
.1701439** 
(.0765936 ) 
.2106674*** 
(.0651789) 
.2503856*** 
(.0768954) 
.2106674*** 
(.0734688) 
.2503856*** 
(.0829489) 
LNAGTFP 
.9057842*** 
(.1733238) 
.9239504*** 
(.1614099) 
.8650677*** 
( .2410166) 
.6748178** 
(.3236695) 
.8650677*** 
(.2583074) 
.6748178** 
(.3049374) 
PRINCE 
.1428545* 
(.0811696) 
.1187834 
(.077351) 
.1357055 
(.1098788) 
.0592744 
( .1196884) 
.1357055 
(.0916483) 
.0592744 
(.0992239) 
Intercept 
1.791651*** 
( .1844742) 
1.77177*** 
(.176088) 
1.848141*** 
(.2038102) 
2.024367*** 
(.2707838) 
1.848141*** 
(.2387889) 
2.024367*** 
(.2779381) 
IV first 
stage 
F-statistic 
- - 
LNAGTFP: 
34.89 
LNURB:  97.78 
LNAGTFP: 
23.73 
LNURB:  68.77 
- - 
R2 .6454 .6494 .6440 . 6270 - - 
observations 45 50 45 50 45 50 
 
Dependent 
variable: 
LNURB 
 
(1) 
Allen (2009) 
(2)               
Allen (2009) 
including 
Portugal 
(3) 
Allen (2009) 
(4)              
Allen (2009) 
including 
Portugal 
(5)             
Allen (2009) 
(6)             
Allen (2009) 
including 
Portugal 
Estimator OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel 
GMM 
Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel 
GMM 
       
TRADEPOP 
.1561592** 
(.0715075) 
.1233145** 
(.0601684) 
.1482911** 
(.0708036) 
.1226452** 
(.0593506) 
.1462312** 
(.0719882) 
.1226452* 
(.0695084) 
LNURBLAG 
.8828436*** 
(.0561658) 
.8221105*** 
(.0669604) 
.8461266*** 
(.0638899) 
.7664851*** 
(.0787729) 
.8365135*** 
(.0686524) 
.7664851*** 
(.0796605) 
LNAGTFP 
.0849642 
(.1346501) 
.2206201 
(.144385) 
.2348374 
(.1955143) 
.4461833* 
(.2591376) 
 
.2740768 
(.2044594) 
.4461833* 
(.2410497) 
PRINCE 
-.0146355 
(.0876832) 
.0220204 
(.0964598) 
.0136305 
(.0940653) 
.0709099 
(.1080748) 
.021031 
(.077972) 
.0709099 
(.0898252) 
Intercept 
-.2418042 
(.1550246) 
-.3920131 
(.1811004) 
-.3549791** 
(.1890826) 
-.5674081** 
(.2391644) 
-.3846102* 
(.1963014) 
-.5674081** 
(.2309346) 
IV first stage 
F-statistic 
- - LNURB: 34.89 LNURB: 23.73 - - 
R2 .9122 .8705 .9101 .8653 - - 
observations 45 50 45 50 50 50 
 
Figure 4. Simulated real wage rates for Portugal, 1500-1800. Sources: see text 
 
 Portugal 
Spain 
England 
Holland France 
 
with gold 
 
without gold 
 
with gold and 
silver 
Without gold 
and silver  
  
1500 0.9 0.8 0.4 0 0 0 0 
1600 4.3 4.2 1.2 0.3 0 0 0 
1700 7.4 6.9 1.4 0.3 2.3 3.7 0.3 
1750 17.0 13.0 1.7 0.8 2.9 6.5 0.1 
1800 22.8 18.4 1.9 0.9 16.1 5.4 0 
Table 4.  Share (per cent) of the real wage attributable to empire, 1500-1800. Sources: see text and 
figure 4. 
 
 Portugal 
 
Spain Britain 
 
Holland 
 
France 
 
with gold 
 
without gold 
(*) 
with gold and 
silver 
without gold and 
silver (*)  
  
1500 
0.08 
(-21.1) 
0.07 
(-18.4) 
0.04 
(-2.9) 
0 
(0) 0 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
1600 
0.25 
(67.6) 
0.25 
(65.8) 
0.13 
(-5.7) 
0.02 
(-0.9) 0 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
1700 
0.38 
(-8.94) 
0.35 
(-7.3) 
0.11 
(-5.2) 
0.03 
(-9.0) 0.22 
0.33 
(5.2) 
0.22 
(0) 
1750 
1.24 
(-30.6) 
0.30 
(17.2) 
0.14 
(35.0) 
0.025 
(153.8) 0.64 
0.72 
(7.2) 
0.01 
(18.5) 
1800 
1.08 
(10.0) 
0.87 
(17.1) 
0.12 
(10.0) 
0.03 
(112.5) 1.38 
0.49 
(74.1) 
0.05 
(73.9) 
Table 5.  Empire extraction rate in “real wage units”, 1500-1800 in the upper line. In parenthesis, the 
ratio of the empire extraction rate differential Britain relative to of a given country divided by the real 
wage gap between them (per cent). Sources: same as for figure 3 and table 4. (*) Assuming invariance of 
real quantities to precious metal imports. 
 
Appendix (for on-line publication only) 
 
In this appendix we consider a variety of methodological details, robustness checks 
and additional information which, for space-saving reasons, we are unable to present in 
the body of the text. We also present additional data and figures. 
 
A1. Methodology and sources for the construction of variables 
 
Information is provided here on the construction of three variables for Portugal during 
the period from 1500 to 1850: intercontinental trade, the land-labour ratio, and the 
proto-industrial labor share. 
 
1.1 Intercontinental trade 
 
We build an index of intercontinental trade statistics which proxies the various flows 
generated within the framework of a colonial pact. In keeping with Allen (2003), we 
measure the effect of empire by means of the volume of total trade in both directions.  
This measure is given by the sum of exports to the colonies of goods produced in the 
mother country (therefore not including re-exports from other European countries) 
and of imports from the colonies to the mother country, whether for consumption or 
for re-export.  
 
To make these statistics comparable with the data for England and the other countries 
in the Allen (2003) database, we convert their total values using sugar and linen prices 
in 1700, respectively for imports and exports. These are then converted into pounds 
sterling at the rate of exchange of 1 pound equals 3600 reis.20 
 
The first official record of the Portuguese balance of trade dates back to 1776-7 and 
has the title of Balança Geral do Comércio. It was supposed to initiate a regular annual 
series but its production was very uneven for the first twenty years, until it started up 
again in regular fashion in 1796, always in manuscript form. It lasted until 1834.21  
 
Prior to the start of this series, we compiled intercontinental trade data from a variety 
of other sources and organized them by main areas of origin, i.e. Africa, Asia and 
Brazil, and by export and import trades. In some instances, exact trade values were 
available but in others it was necessary to proxy from shipping volumes or figures 
given by different sources for the same year. The data comprise all merchandise as 
described and, when presented at current prices, the unit is contos (1 conto= 1,000,000 
reais; 3,600 reais= £1 sterling). Whenever mentioned in the source, the type of 
merchandise is identified.  
 
 
1500 
 
Africa 
 
Exports: exclusively composed of alambéis, a coloured, striped textile produced in 
North Africa but also in southern Portugal and traded on the West coast of Africa. 
                                                          
20 One pound equals nine cruzados, and one cruzado equals 400 reis (or reais). Hence one pound equals 
3600 reis (Morineau 1985), p. 133. 
21 Before 1796, the Balanças Gerais do Comércio were compiled only for 1776-7, 1783 and 1789. 
Values calculated from quantities in Pereira (2003, p. 283) and prices in Vogt (1979), p. 
75.  
 
Imports: recorded entirely as sugar. Values calculated from quantities in Godinho 
(1981-1983, vol. IV), p. 96, and prices in Serrão (1951), p. 15. Imports of precious 
metals (gold) are in Vogt (1979), appendix I, which include both imports by the crown 
plus an additional 20 per cent to account also for private imports. 
 
Asia  
 
Exports: no merchandise recorded. 
 
Imports: quantities from Subrahmanyam (2012), p. 68 and values from Godinho (1981-
3), vol. III, p. 194. 
 
Brazil 
 
Imports: exclusively brazil-wood. Values from Simonsen (1967), p. 61. 
 
Exports: no trade recorded. 
 
1600 
 
Africa 
 
No trade recorded. 
 
Asia  
 
Exports: no trade recorded. 
 
Imports: in total value only, in Boyajian (1993), appendix II, based on data for the 
‘armada’ of 1600. 
 
Brazil 
 
Exports: estimated from the per capita export values carried in 1650 by the ships of 
the monopolistic Brazilian trading company, according to Costa (2002), vol. II, p. 28, 
multiplied by the population of the colony in 1600, to obtain the aggregate value with 
respect to this year.  
 
Imports: brazil-wood - value of the crown monopoly contract for 1602-1612 from 
Azevedo (1973) p. 250; sugar - quantities from unnumbered table entitled ‘production-
exportation’ and prices from p. 298, in Mauro (1983). 
 
1700 
 
 Africa 
 
No traded recorded. 
 
 
Asia 
 
Exports: no trade recorded. 
 
Imports: aggregate values in Godinho (1976), vol. p. 319. 
 
Brazil 
 
Exports: 30% of the total value in Morineau (1985), p. 169 based on Morineau’s 
quotation of early eighteenth-century sources that 70 per cent of Brazilian imports 
were foreign goods re-exported from Portugal to Brazil. 
 
Imports: aggregate value of commodities from Morineau (1985), table 74, p. 484.  
Precious metals: values estimated from Morineau (1985), table 74, p. 484 and then 
deflated by the sugar prices using 1700 as the base year, for consistency with other 
imports. 
 
1750 
 
Africa 
 
Exports: value from Balança do Comércio for 1776. 
 
Imports: value from Balança do Comércio for 1776. 
 
Asia 
 
Exports: value from Balança do Comércio for 1776. 
 
Imports: value from Balança do Comércio for 1776. 
 
Brazil 
 
Exports: calculated as 30 per cent of the total values, in Pinto (1979), pp. 173-4, for the 
fleets to Rio de Janeiro (1750), Bahia and Maranhão (1751), on the assumption that the 
remaining 70 per cent were foreign goods re-exported through Portugal to Brazil, 
according to Morineau (1985), p. 169. 
 
Imports: value of total minted and un-minted gold, in Costa, Rocha e Sousa (2013), p. 
192 ; other commodities in Morineau (1985), table 74, p. 484. 
 
1800 
 
Africa 
 
Exports and imports: Average of respective values from 1799 to 1801, in Balanças do 
Comércio (1800 is missing in the source). 
 
Asia 
 
Exports and imports: Average of respective values from 1799 to 1801, in Balanças do 
Comércio (1800 is missing in the source). 
 
Brazil 
 
Exports and imports: bvalues of all commodities are from Alexandre (1988) vol. 3, 
Tables CLII; XCI; CXVIII; minted gold is the average of the values from 1799 to 1801 
in Alexandre (1988), vol. 3, table XCII. 
 
 
1.2 The land-labour ratio 
 
Measuring agricultural land, the numerator in this ratio, for any economy during the 
Early Modern period is a considerable challenge. A reasonable solution employed in 
the literature is to assume that despite changes over the few last hundreds of years, the 
corresponding number of hectares has not changed much up to the present day, only 
their quality. In this perspective, what matters is the potential resource base, upgrades 
or changes of usage being assigned in the model to changes in “capital stock”. This 
rule of thumb has been adopted for Europe as a whole from 1300 to 1800 by Allen 
(2003). 
 
We follow this approach for Portugal and assume that by 1500 all usable land was 
under some form of husbandry, even if not necessarily the most efficient. This would 
include rough grazing and prolonged fallows. We therefore assume the stock of land 
was equal to the area of “agricultural land” measured by the UN-FAO in the 1950s, 
namely 4.13 million hectares.22 The only available historical evidence for Portugal 
comes in a calculation made in 1875 by the geographer Gerardo Pery (cited in Fonseca 
2005), who assessed the country’s total “productive area” – also excluding forests, a 
concept close to “agricultural land” – as being 4.34 million hectares (Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 1958, volume 12, p. 3).  
 
As regards labour, we use the population as a proxy, similarly to the procedure 
followed for the other countries in the Allen (2003) sample given the lack of evidence 
concerning this variable. We construct a series for the total population of Portugal 
indirectly, on the basis of information from a variety of sources.23 This becomes 
necessary given that it was not until 1801 that a proper census was carried out. Before 
this date, only head counts are available and these were reckoned in terms of “hearths” 
rather than of “souls”. Residents have therefore to be inferred by applying a factor of 
conversion of inhabitants per hearth, a figure which enjoys relative only moderate 
consensus among Portuguese historians. Ratios vary in a range between 3.9 and 5.0.  
We use here a ratio of 4.0, as proposed by Serrão (1993) and Oliveira (2002) based on 
the 1801 census, the only source universally recognized as reasonably accurate. Where 
a hearth count was unavailable, we adopted a “round” guesstimate (e.g. 2 million) 
provided by one or more well-regarded sources.24   
 
                                                          
22 “Agricultural land” is defined as the sum of cropped land, meadow land, pasture and rough grazing. In 
pre-industrial times this would have included a sizeable portion of fallow land in crop rotations. 
23 The only full compilation of Portuguese mainland population statistics is by Rodrigues (2008). 
Unfortunately, its author does not explain how these data were arrived at, which, combined with some 
rather implausible benchmarks, makes this source difficult to use. 
24 In the case of Spain, Drelichman and Gonzalez Agudo (2012) use a ratio of 3.78 for the sixteenth 
century, on the basis of a number of micro studies. 
The procedure is to start from the population in 1500. We then infer values for each 
successive fifty year benchmark by applying the rates of change proposed for each of 
these intervals by the most cogent and dependable sources available. Often these rates 
are based on micro-demographic studies, in combination with other social and 
economic evidence. 
 
We begin with the population count carried out between 1527 and 1532 and usually 
attributed to the year 1530. This has been the object of extensive scholarly scrutiny 
and is considered quite trustworthy. It enables us to anchor our population series 
firmly, to our starting benchmark, in 1500. Our earliest guesstimate therefore is that 
which takes us back to 1500, retropolating from the total population of 1.2 million for 
1530.25 
 
The early 16th century is generally accepted as a time of fast population growth, in the 
wake of a longer demographic surge coming from the 15th century. Notwithstanding, 
we decided not to adopt the estimate by Dias (1988) of an increase of 84 % during the 
period 1497-1532. This was suggested by an examination of 10% of total Portuguese 
hearths concentrated in one region alone (Beira), which seems too narrow. Instead, we 
adopt the increase of 32% proposed by Henriques (2011), which is based on a smaller 
number of hearths but is taken from a more balanced set of counts covering localities 
in the north, centre and south of the country. This leads to an estimate of 0.906 million 
for 1500. 
 
The rapid demographic growth of the 16th century is generally considered to have 
tapered off after 1580. Both Serrão (1993 and 1994) and Rodrigues (2008) allow a 
growth rate of 0.8% a year up to 1550 and then, continuing beyond to 1580, which 
implies, for 1550, a level of 1.35 million. For the end of the century and allowing for a 
slowing down to an annual rate of 0.4% (Serrão 1993), we get a population of 1.857 
million for 1600.26 
 
The common wisdom is that this population slow-down lasted from 1580 to 1620 and 
then gave way to a period of stagnation, which lasted until the 1660s.27 The mid-17th 
century benchmark would thus have corresponded to a population of just over 2 
million, the figure which has been espoused by the three greatest specialists for this 
period – Godinho (1980), Marques (1973) and Oliveira (1971). 
 
Between the end of the war of independence from Spain (1668) and 1700, Portugal 
enjoyed some thirty five years of peace and relative freedom from epidemics. 
Rodrigues (2008) suggests that a population increase of 15% during this period would 
not have been implausible, a view that is endorsed by Magalhães (1993) and Pinto and 
Madeira (2001). The implication would be a total in 1700 of some 2.3 million, a figure 
which seems reasonable even though it contradicts Godinho’s (1955) estimate of 2.1 
million. 
 
                                                          
25 Rodrigues (2008) suggests that the population in 1530 was somewhere between 1.1 and 1.3 million, 
depending on the size of the average hearth. The figure chosen here is based on a value of 4.3 for this 
parameter (Serrão, 1993). 
26 The careful study by Santos (2003) of the Alentejo region adopts for the same period, as an outward 
bound figure, a rate of 0,67%, which is close to the one we have chosen. It also adduces qualitative 
evidence to support this strong population expansion. 
27 The exception is Rodrigues (2008) who prefers to locate the onset of this period of stagnation in 1580 
and has it lasting until 1660. 
The 18th century boasts a greater abundance of hearth counts and a higher degree of 
consensus among historians. There is agreement with regard to 1700-1732, a time of 
epidemics and strong emigration to Brazil (Godinho 1978), which led to a likely 
decline in population at an annual rate of 0.20%. A recovery is widely acknowledged 
for 1732-1776, at 0.68% a year, in contrast with a period of deceleration thereafter, at 
0.24% down to 1801. The combined effect is a 1750 benchmark of 2.359 million and 
one of 2.912 million at the end of the century. The latter tallies with the figure derived 
from the 1801 census. 
 
Summarizing, table A1 presents our population estimates for 1500-1850, as well as the 
sources from which they were derived. 
 
Year Population (m) Source 
1500 0.90 Castro Henriques 
1550 1.35 Serrão; Rodrigues 
1600 1.86 José V. Serrão 
1650 2.00 Oliveira; Godinho; Marques; 
Rodrigues; Magalhães 
1700 2.30 Rodrigues, Magalhães, 
Pinto/Madeira 
1750 2.36 Serrão, Pinto/Madeira; 
1800 2.91 Serrão, Pinto/Madeira; 
Table A1. Portugal’s population, in millions of individuals. Sources: see text. 
 
 
1.3 Urbanization and proto-industrial labour 
 
In this subsection we discuss the occupational structure and the urbanization rate of 
Portugal’s population during this period. This is necessary in order to put together the 
proto-industrial labour share variable required by our model. 
 
In table A2, column 2 we display, alongside total population, the best available figures 
for Portugal’s population living in urban centres. It is defined as the total number of 
inhabitants of agglomerations of more than 5,000 residents. We employ for this a 
single source, namely Bairoch (1988). This has the advantage of offering complete 
coverage for all the sub-periods considered and has been compiled using a uniform 
methodology throughout. 
 
The use of these data requires some care. Bairoch included in his benchmark totals all 
urban centres which were listed in his sources irrespective of size, and then simply 
added them up to obtain “urban population”. Since we want to exclude from the 
category of ‘urban’ all towns having less than 5,000 inhabitants, we have left out all 
the locations which did not satisfy this requirement. At the same time, we have 
recovered the residents of the towns which Bairoch dropped from his count every time 
they were not mentioned in his sources for a particular benchmark, though they are 
known to have continued to exist during this time. When this happens, we assume that 
it was due to an error or omission, and not to a contraction of the population in 
question to a figure below our stipulated minimum. We have therefore interpolated the 
‘missing’ inhabitants at the level observed in the count of the previous benchmark, as 
long as this was not less than 5,000. This inflates Bairoch’s results somewhat28. 
 
 
 
Year 
(1) 
Total 
population 
(2) 
Urban 
population 
(3) 
Agricultural 
population 
(4) 
Proto-
industrial 
population 
1500 0.906 0.155 
(0.171) 
0.601 
(0.663) 
0.150 
(0.166) 
1600 1.857 0.242 
(0.130) 
1.148 
(0.618) 
0.468 
(0.252) 
1700 2.3 0.293 
(0.127) 1.315 
(0.572) 
0.692 
(0.127) 
1750 2.359 0.429 
(0.182) 
1.250 
(0.530) 
0.680 
(0.288) 
1800 2.912 0.476 
(0.163) 
1.596 
(0.548) 
0.840 
(0.288) 
Table A2. Portugal’s occupational structure 1500-1800. Unit: Millions of individuals. In 
parenthesis, per cent of total population. Sources: for column 1, see table A1. For column 2, 
Bairoch (1988), revised. For columns 3 and 4, see text. 
 
How many people were associated with the proto-industrial economy in Portugal 
between 1500 and 1800? To provide the answer we follow the procedure used for the 
other countries in the sample (Allen 2000). We assume that rural dwellers were either 
involved in agriculture or then were non-urban residents living off non-agricultural 
occupations, but never both. Although the latter group encompassed manufacturing, 
transport, trade and administrative activities wherever carried out, we assimilate them 
all here, for the sake of simplicity, to the proto-industrial sector.  
 
The next task is to identify benchmark years which offer reasonably reliable proto-
industrial labour shares. The initial and terminal years of our set appear to satisfy this 
requirement. For 1500, we endorse the presumption (Wrigley, 1985; Allen, 2000) that 
the occupational structure of Europe, up to the early sixteenth century, was roughly 
homogeneous and that agriculture occupied some 80 per cent of the rural population. 
The remaining 20 per cent corresponded to the rural non-agricultural population.29 At 
the end of the continuum, fairly dependable data for this ratio have been constructed 
by Reis (2005) for 1800 and by Sá (2005) for 1750. 
 
The 1700 benchmark is also an independent estimate but rests on weaker evidence. It 
is based on three fiscal rolls pertaining to the “décima” tax and compiled around this 
date from municipal archive material. They contain detailed, reliable information on 
the occupations of the heads of households. They pertain to rural townships (i.e. with 
                                                          
28 For different reasons, Alvarez-Nogal and Prados (2007) have established urbanization data for Spain 
which also departs from Bairoch’s. Our correction is smaller than theirs, however. 
29 These proportions are confirmed by the scarce evidence available for late medieval Portugal. 
According to Godinho (1976), in Alenquer, a small provincial centre, at the end of the fourteen 
hundreds, those engaged in agriculture represented 74 % of the entire population. In the case of Torres 
Vedras, a small town and its hinterland, in 1381 the “non-agricultural population” came to 33% of the 
whole (Rodrigues (1989, p. 22). Further back, in 1369 in Arruda dos Vinhos, also not distant from 
Lisbon, 86% of all households were of farmers, the non-agricultural population representing therefore 
14%. (Marques 1980), pp.126-31. 
less than 5,000 inhabitants) and their respective hinterlands. One of them (Montemor-
o-Novo) is in Alentejo, a thinly populated, predominantly rural province in the south, 
having several ‘agro-towns’, and as such not particularly representative of the country 
as a whole. The other two cases come from Algarve (Castro Marim and Tavira-
Cacela), a coastal region further south, with a higher density of population, many small 
holders and a complete absence of “agro-towns”. Altogether, it would have been much 
more like the rest of the country north of Lisbon.30 Despite the differences between 
these two regions, in 1700 their respective shares of non-urban population engaged in 
agriculture were very similar. They fell within a narrow band from 64 to 67 per cent. 
Pending fresh evidence from additional sources, we have opted for the mean value of 
65.5 per cent and consequently for a proto-industrial labour force ratio of 34.5 per 
cent.31 
 
To complete the data in column 5 of table A2 regarding the size of the proto-indsutrial 
labour force, we have to interpolate a figure for 1600. This is done by assuming for 
Portugal a growth rate for the interval 1500-1600 which is identical to that estimated 
by Alvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2007) for Spain. Column 4 can then be 
derived by subtracting the data in this column from total non-urban population, which 
in turn is obtained by subtracting column 2 from column 1. 
 
The figures in parenthesis in table A2 correspond to the respective shares of total 
population. The advantage of having them lies in allowing us to perceive at a glance 
any shifts in socio-economic population categories and thus grasp structural change 
over time. They can show, for example, the long term weakness of the thrust towards 
urbanization which only picked up in the mid-18th century (column 2), a clear sign of 
delayed modernisation. It suggests equally that the Imperial surge of the 16th century 
did not impact significantly the weight of agriculture by draining large numbers 
ofthose employed in it to the emerging colonies (column 4). 
 
In the same vein, Table A2 also brings to light the fact that the secondary and tertiary 
sectors (column 4) gained ground for two and a half centuries from 1500 and peaked in 
1750 but slowed their contribution to economic modernisation, as Portugal 
approached the beginning of the era of Modern Economic Growth. It reveals the 
apparently steady ruralisation of manufacturing activity during the two first centuries 
considered here and its re-urbanization in the course of the following 150 years. 
 
A2. Model limitations and robustness 
 
The main question related to the model’s identification is that some of the exclusion 
restrictions which identify it could be incorrect. For example, Allen (2009) argues that 
fast TFP growth was endogenous to England’s high wage economy. Other countries, 
                                                          
30 The head town of the county of Montemor-o-Novo had a population of about 3,500 out of a total of 
7,300 for both the town and its hinterland. (Fonseca 1986).  In Castro Marim these figures were 632 and 
1,928, while in Tavira-Cacela they were 1,848 and 2,660. Their agricultural populations were 64 and 67 
% respectively (we include 74 fishermen in Tavira, an important fishing port, and treat “agriculture” 
here as the “primary sector”. In 1725, Portalegre, the town of about 7,500 inhabitants (1480 households) 
had a rural hinterland of about 5,000, where 78% of them were engaged in agriculture. In the town 
itself, between 20 and 30 % of the labour force was also agricultural. In all these cases we have treated 
the usually fairly substantial category of individuals with a “non-identified occupation” as belonging to 
the category of those living off agriculture. 
31 A fourth tax roll is available for the county of Portalegre, also in Alentejo, for 1725. We have not used 
it because the head town had more than 5,000 inhabitants at this time. 
such as Spain, had land-saving biased technical change as an endogenous response to 
different relative prices of capital and labor. This is inconsistent with assuming that 
enclosure is exogenous to the system, as Allen himself does in the model’s estimation. 
International trade itself may have had an endogenous component, as richer empires 
may have been able to generate additional resources which may eventually have led to 
further riches. It may also be difficult to accept the land-labor ratio as exogenous in 
the benchmark estimation. In pre-modern economies and assuming a Malthusian 
scenario, the size of the population should respond to the real wage and hence the 
denominator of the land-labor ratio could be eventually affected by this as well. A 
counterbalancing argument is that, in the model, each period is never less than 50 
years, which attenuates the danger of reverse causation. Indeed, Allen (2003) briefly 
considers an additional equation for population growth and shows the main result is 
not affected. 
 
In the paper, we show our results are robust to a varied choice of estimation methods, 
but other than in the choice of the estimators, we have followed Allen’s methodology 
and identification strategy. Our strongest assumption is the choice of endogenous 
variables and their instruments (Allen 2003, p. 416). We did not perform tests of over-
identifying restrictions, since econometric theorists argue that these tests, while 
common, in fact cannot be used to test for instrument validity (Parente and Silva 
2012). 
 
In addition, we show the instruments are not weak, that is, they are strongly 
correlated with the endogenous variable of interest.32 Notice the often-used “F-statistic 
greater than 10” rule of thumb from Staiger and Stock (1997) only applies to one 
endogenous variable being instrumented and in any case is now outdated (Stock, 
Wright and Yogo 2002). Using the cut-offs suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) we 
conclude that a weak instrument problem in the real wage equation does not exist. We 
recognize that under some specifications the possibility of weak IV cannot be rejected 
for the urbanization equation at standard levels of significance (this could be simply a 
matter of low power). 
 
While we are aware that there are limitations which qualify our results, we believe 
that the advantages of using a dynamic model nevertheless clearly outweigh its 
disadvantages.  
 
Simulation: invariance to the inclusion of Portugal 
 
In this section we justify our decision to use Allen’s original estimates in the 
counterfactual exercises. In the paper (tables 2-4), we show that the estimation of the 
model inclusive of Portugal by alternative estimation methods does not change the 
substantive results. 
 
Indeed, using a series of F tests we do not reject that at most standard levels of 
significance the coefficients of the model with Portugal are equal to those for Allen’s 
original estimation. Even the few for which the formal test fails to reject a difference 
have a similar magnitude in economic terms. We only carry out the test for the same 
estimation methods since tests of equality of coefficients can only be performed either 
                                                          
32 Allen (2003) does not show first stage estimates or discuss the possibility of a weak IV problem, but 
we include an “IV robust F-statistic” row in each of the regression tables. 
for the same estimation method or across estimation methods if the underlying 
parameters are structural. 
 
Observing the estimated coefficients, we can also see that the small differences which 
occur do so in the expected direction. For instance, a comparison between columns (3) 
and (4) of table 2 reveals that when Portugal is included in the sample the estimated 
coefficient for urbanization rises, thus increasing the ‘all else constant’ impact of 
urbanization on the real wage. We additionally note that the encouraging way in 
which Allen’s model reacted to the inclusion of Portugal – a country which presents 
interesting variation in the data due to its unusual mix of very high levels of 
intercontinental trade associated with relatively low real wage levels – is reassuring as 
far as confidence about the model’s external (out of sample) validity is concerned. 
 
A3. Additional figures 
 
In the paper we present the simulated real wage rates under the historical as well as 
no-trade counterfactual scenarios. Here we present the same simulations for the 
remaining endogenous variables. 
 
 
Figure A1: Simulated urbanization rate for Portugal, 1500-1800 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Simulated agricultural TFP for Portugal, 1500-1800 
 
 
 
Figure A3: Simulated proto-industrial labour share for Portugal, 1500-1800 
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